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DOES THE ADOPTION OF "ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED" IMPROVE
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE?

By Matthew Louis Bell
Department of Finance
Advisor: Dr. Tomas Jandik
Department of Finance

Abstract:
Determining how to properly measure corporate
performance is one of the most important problems in
contemporary corporatefinance. Without a sound mechanism to
evaluate managerial performance, a corporation's management
has no adequate standard to be judged by. This can destroy the
firm's value very quickly through poor managerial decisions.
For this reason, managers need to be evaluated and compensated
based on a performance measure that truly demonstrates the
changes in a company's value.
The interests ofexecutives and shareholders do not always
coincide, as can be seen through many of the current corporate
scandals. Thus, it is almost universally argued that the best way
to align these interests is through incentive-based managerial
compensation. As a result, the corporate world is co11stantly
searching for the best financial performance measure to use for
managerial compensation; the better a measure explains the
changes in a corporation's value, the more beneficial it IS in
assessing managerial performance. Some typical methods to
used to compensate and evaluate management include plans
based on accounting performance or stock options I ownership.
Recently, a new method has become a popular method to better
align these interests- Economic Value Added (EVA).
This paperfocuses on the improvements in firms that adopt
EVA for ,nanagerial evaluation and compensation. It compares
the performance changes in firms that adopt EVA and matching
firms (based on industry, asset size, and profitability) that do not
adopt EVA. The time period ofthis study spans from 1985-1997.
The results of this study show what types of companies
would likely improve corporate performance through the adoption
of EVA, and in addition, firms that could benefit from adopting
E\TA will choose to do so.
After the adoption of EVA, numerous studies claim the
adopting firms experience significant improvement in operating
performance and stock performance. Accordingly, I observed
the changes in both the operating performance (measured by
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returns on assets) and the stock performance (measured by
abnormal stock returns, based on a portfolio ofsimilarfirms) of
adopting and non-adopting firms.
The results ofthis study provide strong evidence thatfinns
which adopt Economic Value Added tend to experience significant
improvement in important perfonnance metrics, specifically
changes in returns on assets and abnormal stock returns. Adopting
firms increased (from one year prior to adoption to three years
after adoption) their annual return on assets by 2.68%, while
non-adopters' annual return on assets declined by 0.58%. Even
more convincingly, a large disparity exists in the stock
performance of the adopting firms and non-adopting finns.
Contrary to the results ofcertain previous studies, I found in the
threeyearsfollowing EVA adoption, adoptingfirms outperfonned
the rest of the market by 25.66%, while the non-adopting finns
under-performed the rest of the market by -21.10%. All of the
results fisted in this paragraph are significant at the 5% level.
These findings are consistent with prior research arguing
thatfirms which adopt Economic Value Added tend to experience
significant improvement in important performance metrics,
specifically changes in returns on assets and abnormal stock
returns. In summary, EVA can be a great way to create value for
shareholders.

1. Introduction:
One of the most important problems of contemporary
corporate finance is how to properly measure corpor~te
performance. Without a sound mechanism to evaluate managenal
performance, a corporation's management has no adequate
standard to be judged by. This can destroy the firm's value very
quickly through poor managerial decisions. For this reason,
managers need to be evaluated and compensated based on a
perfonnance measure that truly demonstrates the changes in a
company's value.
In order to maintain a successful business, it is vital for a
company to compensate its executives based on the company's
performance. These incentives give management the prerogative
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to do their best to improve the company's, performance; otherwise
executives might not put a faithful effort into their jobs. What is
in the best interest of a company's shareholders and what is in the
best interest of the company's managers may be entirely different
things. This conflict of interest is commonly referred to as the
"agency problem." Due to this problem, it is critical to give
managementthe incentive to improve a company's performance.
According to Garvey and Milbourn (2001), "There is near
unanimity in the belief that performance-based compensation is
a critically important corporate governance mechanism." Hence,
management compensation plans are in place to help coalesce
shareholders' and manager's interests.
While the top executives of a large corporation typically
receive actual salaries in upper six-to seven-figure range, a
significant portion of their overall compensation comes in the
form of bonuses. Traditional management compensation plans
most frequently occur in two ways, providing bonuses based on
accounting figures and/or issuing stock options. Accountingbased compensation will commonly reward management for
increasing figures like the firm's earnings or sales. Stock options
can give the holder the right to buy stock at a certain price within
a certain time frame. Thus, logic behind this sort of plan dictates
that executives will want to do as much as possible to improve
the company's stock price, in order to maximize their salaries
(the more they raise the stock price, the more money they make).
However, as Jensen and Murphy ( 1990) argue, the overall
compensation for a firm's executives does not adequate! y reflect
the performance of the firm. Their study claims that a corporate
leader has little incentive to improve the corporation's
~rformance. According to their research, there is a very minimal,
If any, correlation between executive compensation and corporate
performance'.
If this is truly the case, then why are the performance
measures used to compensate corporate managers so crucial?
Jensen and Murphy ( 1990) claim the most important aspect of
executive compensation is not how much you pay them, but how.
According to the findings of Wallace ( 1997), firms that adopted
a residual income measure for managerial compensation improved
their residual income, essentially supporting the adage 'you get
what you measure and reward.' Thus, if a corporation utilizes the
best (i.e. most valued by investors) performance measure to
~valuate and compensate its management, it will likely improve
Its performance in that metric. But does the maximization of
certain accounting or stock variables actually lead to value
creation and if so, which ones? This is the ultimate question in
assessing methods of measuring corporate performance.

Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace (1997) argue that firms with
managerial compensation plans based on earnings outperform
othertypes of plans. Others, such as Jensen and Murphy ( 1990)
claim compensation plans that utilize stock options or ownership
are the most effective method. Yet another group of individuals
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feel Economic Value Added (EVA) is the best way to solve this
problem.
This paper focuses on the performance changes in firms
that adopt a new performance measure (for managerial evaluation
and compensation) that has recently become quite popular,
EVA. It compares the performance changes in firms that adopt
EVA and matching firms (based on industry, asset size, and
profitability) that do not adopt EVA. The time period of this
study spans from 1985-1997.
This research shows what types of companies would likely
improve corporate performance through the adoption of EVA,
and in addition, firms that could benefit from adopting EVA will
likely choose to do so.
Most importantly, this paper also provides evidence that
firms which adopt Economic Value Added tend to experience
significant improvement in important performance metrics,
specifically changes in returns on assets and abnormal stock
returns. Adopting firms increased (from one year prior to adoption
to three years after adoption) their annual return on assets by
2.68%, while non-adopters' annual return on assets declined by
0.58%. Even more convincingly, a large disparity exists in the
stock performance of the adopting firms and non-adopting firms.
Contrary to the results of certain previous studies, I found in the
three years following EVA adoption, adopting firms outperformed
the rest of the market by 25.66%, while the non-adopting firms
underperformed the rest of the market by -21.10%.
Section 2 explains the concept of EVA, along with its
alleoed benefits and drawbacks. The hypotheses are listed in
Section 3. The description of the sample and summary statistics
of the sample are displayed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
empirical results. The summary is located in Section 6.

2. What is EVA?
2.1 Concept of EVA:
Economic Value Added is a form of residual income; that
is it is the residue left over after all costs have been covered,
a~cording to Ehrbar and Stewart ( 1999). As such, it is a measu~e
of how much value a company has created. What EV~ does ts
require management to provide a return above what mve_stors
expect to receive. EVA and economic profit a~e relative~y
synonymous. Stem & Stewart trademark ~V~· while economic
profit is essentially the same thing, only ~t IS used by Stem &
Stewart's competitors like Boston Consultmg Group or KPMG.
EVA takes into account the return stakeholde:S in a company
expect. This is accounted for in a company's weighted average
cost of capital (WACC).
WACC = ~ * (E IV)+ Ro * (D IV)* (1 - Tc)
Where: ~ =cost of equity

2
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of EVA, Joel Stem and G. Bennett Stewart, argue that EVA is
highly correlated to market value added (MVA )3 • Basically, they
argue that MVA is (and should be) the overall goal a successful
company achieves when it produces positive EVA.

R0 = cost of debt (%)
E = market value of equity
D = market value of debt
V=D+E
Tc = corporate tax rate
What W ACC essentially does is it takes into consideration
what every dollar of capital invested in the company is expected
to return. After a company's WACC has been calculated, then
EVA can be calculated using the following formula:
EVA=NOPLAT- (WACC

* TC)

Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of EVA is its ability to
judge performance at the divisional level. For multi-divisional
companies, the inability to judge and reward divisional
performance apart from company performance is one of the most
prevailing criticisms of bonuses through stock options. Using
stock options can cause one or more divisional managers to take
credit for the other divisional managers' efforts. If a company's
stock price goes up, but one division performs poorly, that
divisional manger will still reap the rewards of the other divisions'
performance.

Where: NOPLAT =net operating profit less adjusted taxes
TC =total capital 2
Through this computation, EVA is able to determine whether
or not a company produced a return equal to, less than, or above
the return its stakeholders expected. According some to Ehrbar
and Stewart ( 1999). the foundation ofEVA's capital charge (TC)
dates all the way back to Adam Smith, in that a business has to
produce a minimum, competitive return on all of the capital
invested in it. The most unique aspectofEVA is in its accounting
for the required return of both debt and stockholders. This is
unquestionably one of its most valuable traits.

2.2 Benefits of EVA:
One of the more compelling arguments for EVA is in its
effects on all levels of employees. When firms implement EVA,
Stem & Stewart sends some of its professionals out to orchestrate
the process. They have a procedure that allows them to slowly
integrate EVA into the firm. As employees are taught the
specifics about value creation, they become much more aware
about the effects their decisions have on the company's value.
For managers in a firm that gives bonuses based on EVA
results. there is no limit to how much they can earn. Proponents
of EVA claim this encourages managers to increase their
company's performance as much as possible. Additionally,
managers are encouraged to set more ambitious goals for the
company, since managers are compensated on EVA instead of
meeting the goals they set for the company (which would likely
be set too low by management, in order to ensure they get their
bonuses).
Various studies have found EVA adopting companies
outperform non-adopters in certain areas. One of the most often
quot~d is in the improvements to adopters' stock performances.
For mstance, Wallace (1997) states. "Finally, weak evidence
sugge~ts th:t market participants respond favorably to adoption
?f residual mcome-based compensation plans, as evidenced by
mcreased stock returns." Many articles written by the developers
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EVA can prevent this from occurring. Each division has its
own "hurdle" to clear. For instance, a firm could have two
divisions, A (WACC= 10%) and B (WACC=20% ). If A had a
13% return (3% above required return) and B had a 16% return
(4% below required return), then the managers of division A
would receive bonuses, and division B's managers would not
take credit for division A's efforts, even though B's return was
higher than A's.
EVA has exacting demands for what type of return a
company is providing for its shareholders. Its supporters feel
EVA does a better job of incorporating the overall impact a
company's projects make on its invested capital. In their opinions,
management is encouraged to follow shareholders' interests
more closely with EVA-based plans than in traditional forms of
managerial evaluation and compensation.

2.3 Criticisms of EVA:
As stated earlier, not all companies use the same adjustments
to EVA. In fact, the number and type of adjustments that are used
can vary widely. In his survey, Weaver (200 1) found that of the
36 potential adjustments observed, the average company uses
roughly nineteen (with a minimum of seven and maximum of
34). This variability in the determinants of EVA fuels a lot of
criticism from its opponents, in addition to an adverse reaction
from people unfamiliar with the metric. AT&T adopted EVA,
only to abandon it later for several reasons, one being the
complexity of the metric, according to Ittner andLarcker ( 199 8).
Some research has found that EVA has a lower correlation
to stock performance than other performance metrics. In their
paper (frequently cited and/or attacked), Biddle, Bowen. and
. s
Wallace (1997) compare operating cash flows (CFO), earnmg
before extraordinary items (EBEI), residual income (RI), and
Economic Value Added (EVA). Their empirical " ... results
suggest that, in terms of relative information content, earnings
significantly outperforms RI, RI significantly outperforms EVA
(although the gap here is smaller), and all three outperfortn
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CFO." As they point out in the paper, these results almost mirror
the results of Vuong (1989).
Other critics of EVA are quick to site that EVA is too
present-minded. They feel it can encourage managers to liquidate
their assets prematurely, in order for management to receive
large benefits from selling parts of the company that may or may
not be beneficial to Iiquidate4 •
As stated earlier, EVA is one method in place to align
managerial decisions with shareholders' interests. In a 1994
roundtable discussion, Professor Jerold Zimmerman argues EVA
has solved part of this problem. He contends that the creators of
EVA have succeeded in putting the net present value (NPV) I
discounted cash flow (DCF) method into a form which can be
used by some corporations for performance measurement.
However, he feels EVA does not work well in firms that are
unwilling to decentralize. In other words, for EVA to be effective
firms must be willing to "empower" operating managers; they
must be comfortable with less ofa "top-down" corporate structure.
Some argue that EVA isn't the factor behind improved
company performance. Rather, as Wallace ( 1997) notes, "Finns
that adopt new performance measures in their compensation
¥1ans may be changing other aspects of their environment. This
IS alleged to be the case with firms adopting EVA. In particular,
firms that use the consulting firm Stem Stewart and Co. to help
~em implement an "EVA financial management system" often
Increase the intensity of their incentives along with increased
education leading to employees having a greater awareness of
the ~pportunity cost of capital and value creation. It is therefore
~sstble that the observed effects attributed to the residual
Income measure are at least partially the result of environmental
changes."
Another criticism of EVA stems from the fact that a lot of
EVA adopters were performing poorly at the time of adoption.
A~ a consequence, critics claim the change to EVA isn't the
pnmary factor in improved performance as much as the fact that
something, rather, anything needed to be done in order to change
the company's performance. For instance, Hogan and Lewis
(200 I) feel "closer examination of the adopting firms indicates
that they are relatively poor performers prior to adoption of these
plans, however, and that the improved stock return and operating
pe~ormance may not be unique to [EVA] adopters.5" They
mamtain adopters of EVA improve their operations and stock
performance, but the improvements are roughly the same as
comparable firms that do not adopt EVA.
More specifically, Hogan and Lewis (2001) found that
adopters significantly improved their long-term operating
performance, as measured by numerous accounting measures
s.uch as returns on assets from the year prior to adoption to four
~ears ~fter adoption. Although they found improv_ement in
perating measures such as ROA, they did not find the Improved
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performance to be significantly different from non-adopters. In
addition, Hogan and Lewis find no significant difference in the
stock performance of adopters (18.6%, on an annualized basis)
and non-adopters (23.4%) in the four years following adoption.

3. Hypotheses:
Clearly, a lot of studies have been conducted in determining
the best method to alleviate the "agency problem" in corporate
management. More specifically, researchers have been trying to
solve what form of managerial compensation produces superior
results in companies' financial performances.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not
EVA adoption improves companies' financial performances. As
Wallace ( 1997) found, the performance measures managers are
compensated on will improve. As a result, the more important a
performance measure is to an investor, the more beneficial it will
be in judging managerial performance.
As many papers such as Hogan and Lewis (2001) suggest,
the performance measures investors arguably care the most
about - returns on assets and stock returns - should be the most
relevant measures on which to base corporate performance. In
the end it comes down to whether or not an investor makes
adequate money on his or her investment.
This paper extends the work of Hogan and Lewis (200 I),
although it approaches the data in a slightly different manner.
While their results suggest no significant improvement due to
EVA adoption, their performance metrics may not reflect the
true value creation of adopters.
The results of this study differ from Hogan and Lewis
(2001) primarily due to the method of determining ~t~k
performance. This paper uses amorerecentmethodof det~rmimng
stock performance, designed by Lyon, Barber, and Tsat (1999 ).
Rather than measuring stock performance based solely on a
portfolio using the daily CRSP value-weigh_ted NYSE~
AMEXNASDAQindex, this paper uses a method which compares
firms based on a portfolio that accounts for market _value, tx:okto-marketofequity, and prior-performance. Append_ut C p_rov~des
a description of the methodology behind this portfolio denvatton.
A corporation will do what it feels is necessary in order to
facilitate its primary function: to make money. As Wallace
(1997) found, the performance mea~ures manag~rs are
compensated on will improve. Thus, tf a corporation can
compensate managers on a performance measur~ that mo~
closely approximates what shareholders deem to be tmportant,tt
will likely do so, as one would expect these performance measures
to then improve. Therefore, I argue:

HI: The comparu·es that are expected to benefit the
most from the adoption of EVA win, in fact, adopt EVA. In
anies are rational; they will attempt to
fitabl
other words, comp
operate in wbatevermannerproves to be the most pro I
e.
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H2: Finns that adopt EVA should experience substantial
improvements in accounting performance as measured by
return on assets in addition to significant gains in their stock
returns.
4. Description of Sample:
Appendix A contains the sample used in the following
analysis. It is a combination of the samples from two papers:
"Adopting residual income-based compensation plans: Do you
get what you pay for?" by James Wallace (1997), and "The
Long-Run Performance of Firms Adopting Compensation Plans
Based on Economic Profits" by Chris Hogan and Craig Lewis
(2001).
The sample includes fifty-seven firms that adopted
compensation plans that use a residual income performance
measure. The disclosure in each firms' proxy statements
confirmed the adoption of an EPP as well as the specific year of
adoption, which ranges from 1986 to 1994. After establishing a
sample of adopters, matching firms are then included based on
several factors. In Wallace's sample, firms that adopt EVA are
matched with firms that utilize earnings-based compensation
plans. Except for a handful of firms, matching firms have the
same* four-~igit SIC and comparable total asset size in the year
before_ adoption: In the sample for Hogan and Lewis, a pool of
matchmg firms m the same two-digit industry is made based on
total asset size (between 25% and 200% of the corresponding
adopters). Then, all of the non-adopters meeting this criterion are
sorted based on which firm has the closest OIBD I Assets ratio
with the closest non-adopter selected as the matching company:
If no firm meets this condition, then all of the non-adopters with
assets of 90% to 110% of the adopter's total assets are ranked
and the firm with the closest OIBDIAssets is selected as th~
matching firm.
M~y of the adopting firms (such as American Freightways
Corporation and Quaker Oats Company) are included in both
p~pers. ~fan adopting firm was included in both papers (albeit
with a dtfferent matching firm), then the matching firm listed in
Hogan and Lewis's paper is used, since it is a more current paper
than Wallace's paper.

Summary ~tatistics for the sample are displayed in Table 1.
The sample penod_co~sists of data ranging from 1985 to 1997.
Through the exammatmn of the appropriate proxy statements
adopters are
- ·a~'
. defined as firms that adopted EVA ~o
,, r mana.:;en
co~pensatto~. Non-adopters are the firms which have been
patred u~. With the adopting firms, matched up based on the
adopte~ mdustry' total asset size, and profitability, as stated in
the previOus section.
All data _was acquired through Compustat. It was collected
for each fmn m the sample from the year prior to adoption (year
-1) :o three years after adoption (year 3). The top and bott
outliers for both adopte
d
.
om
rs an non-adopters m each category
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were removed. ROA is defined as earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets. Leverage is defined as total
debt to total assets. 6

5. Discussion of Empirical Data
5.1 Analysis for Probability of EVA Adoption:
Table 2 provides the probit analysis for the probability of
EVA adoption. The dependent variable is a (0, I) dummy
variable f6r adopting EVA, where l denotes an adopting firm
and 0 is a non-adopting firm. Appendix B explains the control
variables' possible relationship with the probability of EVA
adoption, as well as the predicted relationship to long-term
performance. All of the accounting control variables are from the
Compustat database.
Sales are found to be positively correlated to EVA adoption
in all three models, two of which are statistically significant at the
10% level. This is consistent with claims that EVA is more
beneficial for larger corporations, because they are subject to
larger agency costs. Cash to Total Assets is very negatively
correlated in all three models with the adoption ofEVA, all at the
5% significance level. This is to be expected, as more established
firms' managers are less likely to be pressured to change their
operations. Dividend payout is also negatively correlated with
EVA adoption in all three models (two at the 10% significance
level); which is understandable, since less risky firms are argued
to receive fewer benefits from adopting EVA.
More important! y, the two performance measures added in
models 2 and 3 are positively correlated with EVA adoption. In
model 2, the change in return on assets from year -I to year 3 is
very influential to the probability of adopting EVA, significant
at the 10% level. Model 3 includes three-year abnormal stock
returns (defined in Appendix C) which is positively correlated
with the probability ofEV A adoption at the 1% level. These two
results support hypothesis H I, that firms which are expected to
benefit the most from EVA will adopt EVA.

5.2 Changes in Returns on Assets:
Table 3lists the performance changes of adopters and no~
adopters. 6. ROA (Absolute) is the difference between ROA Ill
year 1 (or3) andyear-1. 6.ROA (Relative) is therelativechange
in ROA from year 1 (or 3) and year -l.lts formula is7 :
L\ROA (Absolute)= ROAYR 1 (OR 3)- ROAYR-I
6.ROA (Relative)= (ROAYR I

(0R3)

-ROil.
) I RO~-~
''¥R-1

The abnormal stock returns for one (and three) years are the
abnormal returns from year 0 to year 1 (or 3).
.
~dopting firms dramatically improved their performance
mall SIX categories. The medians for A ROA (Absolute) from
Y_ear_-I to year 3 and A ROA (Relative) from year -I to year I are
sigmficant from zero at the 5% level. The medians for the other
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two ROA changes are significant from zero at the 10% level.
This evidence is consistent with Wallace (1997) in claiming the
adoption ofEVA improves firms' return on assets. This partially
supports the research of Hogan and Lewis, as they found that
adopters significantly improved their long-term operating
performance, measured by numerous accounting measures such
as returns on assets from the year prior to adoption to four years
after adoption. Although they found improvement in operating
measures such as returns on assets, they did not find the improved
performance to be significantly different from non-adopters.
Contrary to the results of Hogan and Lewis (2001), the
changes in ROA for the firms that adopted EVA significantly
outperformed the changes in ROA for the firms that did not adopt
EVA in every single category. Half of the medians for nonadopting firms are significant from the difference in the two
samples at the 5% significance level. Of particular note, the
absolute change in the return on assets of adopters (year- 1, year
3) is 2.68%, while the absolute change in non-adopters' ROA is
-0.58%. These medians are significant from each other at the5%
level. This analysis supports hypothesis H2, as it provides pretty
~onclusive evidence that the adoption of EVA can dramatically
Improve a company's return on its assets.

5.3 Changes in Abnormal Stock Returns:
The last two columns of Table 3 report the abnormal stock
~etums (defined in Appendix Q. Both the mean and median

Improvements over one and three years of EVA adopters
considerably outperformed the market over both the one and
three year time periods following adoption. Both the medians
and even the means are significant from zero at the 5% level. This
evidence supports Stem & Stewart's claims that adopting
Economic Value Added can significantly increase a firms'

MVA.

The differences in abnormal stock returns for adopters and
non-adopters are also very significant. The median one-year and
three-year abnormal stock returns for adopters (both significant
~t 5% level) are 8.62% and 25.66%, respectively. On the other
and, the non-adopters' abnormal stock returns (0.28% and2LIO%) were not as enviable. The three-yearnon-adopter
abnormal return of -21.10% is statistically sianificant from the
d"f£
.
0
1
erence m the medians of the two sub-samples (adopters and
non-adopters) at the 5% level. This provides strong evidence in
support of H2, that the adoption of EVA can improve firms'
stock performance.

~·4 Regression Analysis
am pies:

of Performance Changes in

Regression analysis of the performance changes in EVA

ad~pters and non-adopters is provided in Table 4. The dependent
vanables in the four models are different performance measures:
the absolute changes in return on assets from year -1 to year 1•
rei ·
atiVe changes in ROA from year -1 to year 3, abnormal stock
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returns over a one year period (year 0 to 1), and abnormal stock
returns over a three-year period (year.O to 3). Five independent
variables are regressed against these dependent variables, which
are explained in further detail in Appendix B.
Of all theresultsfrom the analysis, the most important is the
strong correlation found between the adoption of EVA and three
of the four different performance measures. EVA adoption is
determined using a "dummy" variable, i.e. a (0,1) statistic, where
I denotes the adoption of EVA in year zero and 0 implies a firm
did not adopt EVA in year zero. EVA adoption is positively
correlated with the absolute change in return on assets (year -1,
year 3), significant at the 5% level. One year abnormal returns
are also positively correlated with adoption (at the 10% level).
Most noticeably, the coefficient for three year abnormal returns
(0.4976) is significant at the 5% level. This result provides a very
strong confirmation of hypotheses H 1 and H2.
These results are in stark contrast to those presented by
Hogan and Lewis (2001), who find no significant difference in
the annual stock performance of adopters (18.6%, on an
annualized basis) and non-adopters (23.4%) in the four years
following adoption. However, these differences are not that
unexpected, as it should be mentioned that the results in this
study utilize more recent methods for determining stock
performance, designed by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). 8
Again, both of the three year performance measures show
EVA adoption to be positively correlated, significant at the 5%
level, while adoption is positively correlated to the one year
abnormal returns at the 10% level. The stronger correlation
between adoption and three-year performance measures can be
explained fairly simply. It takes time to implement EVA. The
effects of adoption should be more pronounced at a three-year
interval, as a longer time is provided for the adopting firm to
adjust to its new financial management system.

6. Conclusion:
Determining the best way to measure corporate executive
performance is a crucial problem for a~y firm. If managers ~an
be properly evaluated. their compensation can_ be used to a!Jgn
managerial and shareholder interests, combatmg agency cost~
and helping maximize shareholder wealth.

This paper provides analysis_ as to why ~VA is a proficient
way to accomplish this. It contradicts the findmgs of Hogan and
Lewis (2001), which establishes that even ~hough adopters
significantly improved their long-term operatmg performance
(a~cording to numerous accounting measures such~ ~OA and
OIBD I Assets), theirimproved performance was not sJgnJ~cantly
different from non-adopters. In addition. Hogan and Lew~s argue
, t k performances were not significantlv different
a dopters s oc
•
from non-adopters.
this paper fmds EVA adopters significantly
.
· al
M eanwhi!e,
outperform non-adopters in improvements to therr operalion
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performance (as measured by returns on assets) and abnormal
stock returns. For instance, adopters' median improvement in
returns on assets from year -1 to year 3 is 2.68% (significant at
the 5% level), whereas non-adopters' median change in returns
on assets forthe same period is -0.58.% (also significant at the 5%
level). Furthermore, adopters outperform the stock market (from
year 0 to year 3) by a median of 25.66%, while non-adopters
experience median abnormal returns of -2l.l0%. Both values
are significant at the 5% level.
These results are consistent with prior research (O'Byrne,
1999, Stewart, 1994, Stem eta!, 1995) arguing that firms which
adopt Economic Value Added tend to experience significant
improvement in important performance metrics, specifically
changes in returns on assets and abnormal stock returns. In
summary,EVAcanbeagreatwaytocreatevalueforshareholders.

Endnotes:
1
Jensen and Murphy (1990) determine a wise decision from a CEO
which increases a company's market value by $100 million will result in
a two-year increase in a CEO's compensation of $6,700, while a decision
(that is beneficial for executives, but not shareholders, such as the
purchase of a new aircraft for the corporate fleet) which destroys $10
million in shareholder value will result in lowering a CEO's compensation by 525,900. Frankly, neither of these scenarios should matter much
to someone who is likely making more than 520,000 per week. In their
opinion, a large part of this problem is due to the intense public criticism
of the seemingly excessive compensation of corporate managers. In order
to appease public opinion, corporate boards are less apt to truly pay
managers based on the firm's performance, which, by essentially compensating executives at a relatively stagnant amount, executives are
given little incentive to improve the performance of the fum.
2
TC is roughly the value of all of a company's assets. However, before
EVA can be calculated, adjustments are usually made to both NOPLAT
and TC. Examples of this include adding research and development
expenditures to NOPLAT or adding back accumulated goodwill and
operating leases to TC. Over one hundred adjustments to these figures
can be used in calculating EVA. Interestingly enough, not all companies
use the same adjustments, and most companies tend to use only up to 56 adjustments consistently (Garvey and Milboum.(2001)).
3
MVA is the defined as the difference between a company's current
market capitalization and the economic book value of the capital it
employs.
' \Vhile this is a valid criticism, this argument can be applicable to
virtually any executive compensation scheme. Typically, different compensation plans have measures that attempt to account for this "timehorizon" agency problem. According to Stem et al (1995), EVA combats
this through the use of il~ "bonus bank," which partially delays (and
possibly negates) the payment of EVA-based bonuses, dependant on the
company's future health.
5
In their paper, Hogan and Lewis set out to determine the long-term
effects of EVA adoption, particularly its effects on accounting operating
performance (returns on assets (ROA), operating income before depredation to total assets (OIBD/ Assets),etc.) and stock returns.
'Definition for leverage in terms of Compustat variables is: Leverage
= [(data9 + data3-l) I data6]
7
ROA definition is EBIT I Total Assets. ROA definition in terms of
Compustat variables is: ROA =[(data 13- data 14) I data 6}
• Hogan and Lewis measure stock performance (for the four years
after adoption) based on a portfolio using which uses the daily CRSP

val~e-weightedNYSE-AMEX-NASDAQindex.Thispaperusesarnethod

which measures stock performance (for the three years after adoption)
based on a portfolio that accounts for the market value, bookto-rnarket of
equity, and prior-performance of firms.
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Faculty Comment:
Mr. Bell's mentor, Tomas Jandik, made the following
comments about his student's work:
Matt's research topic was exceptionally relevant - both
because of its importance for contemporary financial research
and because it allowed Matt to acquire analytical skills and
financial intuition very beneficial for his future business career.
The project execution on Matt's part was flawless. Not only he
was able to theoretically familiarize himself with the problem of
optimal measurement of corporate performance, but he also
undertook empirical data analysis of the long-term performance
of firms adopting so called "performance compensation plans."
He extended the work of several influential finance studies on
this topic and, notably, found very contrasting results leading to
different conclusions from previously published financial studies.
As a result, Matt Bell's thesis is not just a simple literature review
study. It is a quality empirical financial analytical project. In
contrast to some previous financial studies, the results of Matt
Bell's honors thesis suggest that companies adopting "Economic
Value Added" methodology to compensate managers outperform
their non-adopting peers in the long run.
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The problem that Matt studied is far from clear cut. In fact,
the ability of Economic Value Added methodology to motivate
managers to create value has been quite a controversial topic in
contemporary corporate finance. Whereas many people agree
that managers who are paid based on their firm's performance
make better corporate decisions and create more wealth for their
investors, experts differ in their opinions on how to properly
measure the "true" corporate performance.
Recently, an increasing number of finance practitioners
has been claiming that a newly developed method for measuring
corporate performance called "Economic Value Added" (EVA)
can do the best job at measuring true corporate performance.
EVA uses sophisticated financial techniques to create unique
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profit targets-based on the nature of business and the amount of
currently invested capital-for each of company's divisions. As
a result, each divisional manager can be properly motivated to
create value and thus, the propcnents claim, EVA generates a
superiorperformance-monitoring scheme compared to traditional
stock and accounting profits based methods.
Matt Bell's research (based on sound financial
methodologies) did uncover very interesting results that suggest
Economic Value Added is indeed a superior method for moti vali ng
managers to create wealth. One can say that thanks to how
controversial and unresolved EVA topics are, Matt Bell's honors
thesis provides a true contribution to the contemporary finance
research.

Appendix A. Sample
Adopten

NoD-Adopten

Name
Georgia-PaciiJC Group
Donaldson Co Inc
CSXCmp.
Orange Co
Briggs & Stratton
Crane Co.
Quaker Oats Co
Brandon Systems Corp
Cincinnati Milacron Inc
·Ball Corp
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp
VigoroCorp
92675410
Applied Power
APPlied Bioscience Inti Inc
wel.bnan Inc
Scott Paper Co.
Hamischegger Industries Inc
Allegheny Teledyne Inc I
Telettvne
W.W. Grainger, Inc.
Natiooal Data Corp
Primark Corp
American Freightways Corp
Comptronix Corporation
Duraceil International, Inc.
R P Scherer Corp
L.A. Gear Inc
Coca-Cola Co
Eastman Kodak Co
Johnson Worldwide Associates
Kinetic Concepts Inc
Pepsico Inc
Autoclave Engineers, Inc.
TransAmerica Corp.
Deere&Co
IDHeinzCo
Ashland Inc.
varity Cotponuion
FuronCo
Tektronix Inc
lncstar Corp
Jefferies Group, Inc.
American Precision Inds
Manitowoc Co

CUSIP
37329810
25765110
12640810
68417710
10904310
22439910
74740210
10530310
17217210
05849810
12709710
03822510
03791710
94970210
80987710
41334510

Year of
Adoption
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

01741510

1993

38480210
63562110
74190310
02629VIO
20476CIO
26633010
80652810
50170810
19121610
27746110
47925410
49460Wl0
71344810
90921CIO
89348510
24419910
42307410
04420410
92224R60
36110610
87913110

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994

46I45FIO
02906910
56357110
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NFort Howard Paper Company
AST Research Inc
Sanm Fe Pacific

CUSIP

Trimas Corporation
Unit Corporation
My!an Laboratories
Bancteclnc
EmonCmp
Minerals Technologies Inc.
Union Camp Corp
Tandem Computcn Inc.

34746110
00190710
80218310
76857510
23768810
13973020
24236110
7S409P20
64121710
89621510
90921810
62853010
05978410
29356110
60315810
90553010
87537010

Carpenter Technology Corp

14428510

Riverbend lntemat:iooal Corp
Data General Corp
Capital Associates, Inc
Deans Foods Co.
Ratiooal Software Corp
Network Systems Corporation

WliXlllaD Ind
94412410
OlstenCorp
68138510
Ceridian Corp
I56mJO
Inttenet, Inc.
46119010
8685321()
s\IPCfteX Inc
Sunbeam Oster Co Inc
86707110
Calgon Carbon Corp 12960310
Vam, Inc.
92193010
Kellogg Co.
48783610
LDnJ cot!)
54385910
68250510
Oneida Ltd
Chromaaft Revingtal. Inc.
17111710
03522910
Anheuser Busch Cos. Inc.
36851410
Gelman Sciences
54042410
~Corp
03783310
Apple Computer Inc.
96647K10
Whitman Corp.
71644EIO
Petro-Canada Inc.
38238810
GoodrichBF
14252210
Carlisle Plastics Inc
91210710
45337010
United Sutcs Surgical Corp
36465710
Gamma Biological:s Inc
52490110
Legg Mason Inc
44307310
Howell Industties, Inc.
87970010
Tebr.oaCrop
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Appendix A. Sample (continued)
Non-Adopters

Adopters
Name

CUSIP

Equifaxlm:
Merrill Lynch and Co., Im:.
Medtronic Inc
Premark International Inc
Maritrans Inc
Beckman Instruments, Im:.
Tennant Co
Inti Murex Tech Corp
Kaiser Aluminum Corp
Revco D.S. Inc
Eastman Chemical Company
MerixCorp
Matthews International Corp
Gr.mcare Inc

29442910
59018810
58505510
74045910
57036310
88034510
46005H10
48300710
76133910
27743210
59004910
57712810
38518910

Year of
Adoption
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994

Name
Novell Inc
Salomon Inc
Stryker Corp
Pall Corp
Seacor Holdings (Seacor Smit)
Perkin-Elmer
Kronoslnc
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Maxxamlnc.
Longs Drug Store Corp
PPG Industries Inc
KossCorp.
Synalloy Corp
Humana Inc (Extendicare Inc)

CUSIP
67000610
79549B10
86366710
69642930
07581110
81190410
71404610
50105210
94268310
57791310
54316210
69350610
50069210
87156510
30224T87

Appendix B. Control Variables Influencing the Probability of EVA Adoption and Long-Term Firm Performance
Size (Sales and
Total Assets)

Positive: Larger finns are subject
to higher agency costs, so they
may benefit more from adopting
EVA.

Larger firms are less likely to
go bankrupt, they are more
successful.

Free Cash Flows
Total Assets

Negative: More successful firms
are less prone to change their
operations.

Positive: Market has already
taken prior performance into
account.
Negative: If ex-post
accounting performance is
poor, then perfonnance can
likely go nowhere but up.

Market I Book
(Assets)

Positive: Riskier companies are
frequently considered to benefit
more from EVA adoption.

Riskier companies are
typically. expected to have
more growth opportunities, in
addition to being more
profitable.

Negative: Finns with more debt
are monitored more closely than
finns with less debt, due to banks'
monitoring of their investments.

Indeterminate: Highly
levered firms are usually less
risky and more profitable, but
are also subject to a higher
probability of bankruptcy due
to the large amounts of debt.

Cash/Total
Assets

Negative: More established firms
are less likely to be pressured to
change.

Interest Co\·erage

Negative: Same reasoning as
Leverage.

Price I Earnings

Positive: Same reasoning as
Market to Book (Assets).
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Appendix B, Continued.

Dividend Payout

A ROA (Year -1,
3)

3 Year Abnormal
Stock Returns

Negative: More mature firms that
have less risk and fewer growth
opportunities are more likely to
pay dividends.
Positive: According to Wallace
(1997), firms that adopt EVA are
likely to improve ROA
Positive: EVA adopters have been
argued to experience increased
stock performance following
adoption.

Appendix C. Abnormal Returns

Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics

Abnormal stock returns for each firm are calculated in the
following manner, first utilized by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai
(1999):

The sample period consists of data ranging from 1985 to
1997. Adopters are defined as firms that adopted EVA, which
was determined through the examination of appropriate proxy
statements. Non-adopters are the firms which have been matched
up to adopting firms, as stated previously in the paper. The
following data was acquired through Compustat for the years
prior to adoption (Year -I) to three years after adoption (Year 3)
for both adopters and non-adopters. ROA is defined as EBIT
divided by total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt to total
assets.

l) Fourteen size reference portfolios are generated by
separating all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange into
deciles by market value at the time of adoption. The smallest size
decile was then separated into quintiles (to account for the fact
that Amex and NASDAQ firm are typically much smaller,
overpopulating the lowest decile). Amex and NASDAQ stocks
are then added into portfolios based on NYSE sizes.

2) Five book-to-market equity portfolios are also
constructed. They are established by separating all firms into
quintiles based on book-to-market in the year of adoption.
3) Three prior-performance reference portfolios are
established by separating all firms into prior-performanceterciles.
Prior performance is measured as a twelve month buy-and hold
strategy.
4) Each target firm is then matched to all firms that belong
in. the same size, book-to-market, and prior-performance
portfolios. The abnormal return for each target fmn is then
Calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of
the company and the buy and-hold return of the portfolio. If
either the target fmn or any other firm in the portfolio delists,
then proceeds from the investment are re-invested into an equallyWeighted market CRSP return until the maturity of the investment.

Compustat Formulas for Variables: Total Assets= [data6]
ROA = [(data13- data14) I data6] Leverage [(data9 + data34) I
data6] Market to Book (Assets)= [fdata25 * data199 + (data6data,60)) data6] Price to Earnings= [datal991 data58] Capital
Expenditures (CAPEX) to Assets= [data30 I data6]
I

Adootc:n
I
Non·~~
Median I STD I Mean I Median
STD
23416.9 i
630.2 · 696s.s I 4847.9 I 652.9
3357.6
6.72~· i
9.73% 1 5.48% I !0.62% ! 8.67%
10.08~,.
1
6.t9% I
10.45% 10.59% i 6.04% I !0.73% 9.76%
786.0 I
117.3 I 1623.8 I 403.5 I 75.2
693.2
1.420
0.655
1..536 I 0.601 I 1.657
!.601
15.156
15.450 I 14.858 I 14.783 I 11.2so
14.379
0.033
0.063 I 0.028 I 0.036 I 0.047
0.060

l

Mean

Total Assets
ROA(Year-1)
ROA(YearO)
I,e-.-.:rage

Market f Book (Assets)
Price I Eamiru!s
CAPEXI Assets

I

!

5) Finally, the abnormal sample firm portfolio return is
then' computed as the difference between average sample fmn
returns and average returns on matched portfolios.
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Table 2: Analysis of EVA Adoption Probability
Table 2 examines factors that may influence a firm's decision to adopt EVA. The dependent variable is a (0, l) statistic, where
the variable is equal to I if a firm adopted an EVA metric, and the variable is equal to 0 if a firm did not adopt EVA. Free Cash Rows
to Total Assets is defined as (Operating Income Before Depreciation - Interest Expense - Income Taxes - Preferred Dividends Common Dividends) I Total Assets. A ROA (Year -1, 3) is the absolute difference between a firm's ROA in year 3 and year -1. Interest
Coverage is (Interest Expense+ Pretax Income) I Interest Expense. 3 Year Abnormal Stock Returns (as defined previously) is a measure
of the firms' abnormal stock performance from year I to year 3. T -statistics are in parentheses.and *demonstrate variables' significance
at I o/c, 5%, and \0%, respectively.
Compustat Formulas for Variables: Free CashAowsiTotalAssets= [ {datal3 -datal5 -datal6 -datal9 -data2 l)j I data6] Interest
Coverage= {(datal S- datal 70) I datal S I

Intercept
Sales
Free Cash Flows I Total
Assets
Market I Book (Assets)
Leverage
Cash I Total Assets
Interest Coverage
Price I Earnings

Dividend Payout

Modell
0.6499
(1.28)
0.0618*
(1.72)
-2.4030
(-0.73)
0.1142
(0.50)
-1.3563
(-1.49)
-3.4533**
(-2.01)
-0.0223
(-1.60)
0.0120
(1.40)
-0.4897*
(-1.65)

A ROA (Year -1, 3)
3 Year Abnormal Stock

1Uturm

-

Model2
0.6849
(1.18)
0.0430
(1.07)
-5.3751
(-1.38)
0.2305
(0.97)
-1.1031
(-0.97)
-5.3102**
(-2.49)
-0.0189
(-124)
0.0192
(1.58)
-0.8424*
(-1.81)
5.6379*
(1.85)

-

Model3
0.7051
(1.22)
0.0720*
(1.84)
-3.9909
(-1.16)
0.2316
{0.91)
-1.7794
(-1.55)
-5.3742**
(-2.47)
-0.0181
(-1.11)
0.0087
(1.19)
-0.5412
(-1.20)

0.5888***
(2.63)

Table 3: Performance Changes of Adopting and Non-Adopting Firms
- ,~ RO~ (Absolute) is the differenc: in firms' ROA in year I (or 3) and year -1. A ROA (Relative) is the relative difference in
l~m1~ ROA tn year l (or 3). Its formula 1s A ROA (Relative)= (ROAyR 1 (OR 3) ROAyR -1) 1 ROA R -1. *** ** and* denotes
sigmficance from ze~o at I% • 5%, and I 0%. respectively.###,##, and# denotes the statistical signific~ce of the diff~rence between
subsamples of adoptmg and non-adopting firms on I%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
A ROA (Absolute)
(-1,1)
(-1,3)

A ROA Relative)
(-1,1)
(-1,3)

0.84

1.71..

12.04

14.22

s.ss··

30.51**

1.56*

2.68··

12.47..

19.50*

8.62**

25.66••

Mean

0.48

-1.3511#

0.80

-16.30~

-2.66

-13.69#11

Median

0.99

-0.58##

3.66

-7.74"

0.28

-21.10##

Mean
Adopters
Median

I

I

NonAdopters

Abnormal Stock Returns
1 year
3vear
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Table 4 Regression Analysis of Performance Changes in Adopting and Non-Adopting Firms
T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,and* denotes significance from zero at I%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Dependent Variables
Intercept

ROA - Absolute
(-1,1)

ROA - Absolute
(-1,3)

1 Year Abnormal
Returns

3 Year Abnormal
Returns

0.0155

-0.0045
(-0.23)
0.0286••

-0.1446
(-1.39)
0.1275.

-0.2354
0.4976..

(2.41)
-0.8177···

. (1.94)

(2.60)

0.1288

0.2669

(0.84)
Adoption (0,1)

-0.0008
(-0.07)

Free Cash Flows I
Total Assets (Year -1)

-0.2421"

J-0.7~

(-1.75)

(-5.69)

(0.20)

(0.1~

Assets (in
$thousands) (Year 0)

0.0012

-0.0026
(-0.89)

0.0099
(0.62)

Leverage (in
$thousands) (Year o)·

-0.0024
(-0,17)

-0.0308
(-0.40}

Market I Book
(Assets) (Year 0)

0.0045
(0.41)

0.0087
(0.60)
0.0377....

-0.0110
{-0.242_
0.0835
(0.37)_

(0.40)

N
Adjusted R-Square

93
-0.0045

F-Stat

0.9167
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(3.44)
82
0.3479
8.1095···

0.0628
(1.01)
81
0.01949
1.3181

-0.0022
J-0.011
82
0.02619
1.4358
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